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Some Bargain: How Bankruptcy Courts May
Now Require a Debtor to Relinquish
Expectations of Privacy. as a Condition of the
Bankruptcy Bargain
JENNIFER TAYLOR*
INTRODUCTION
Discharge of debt in bankruptcy is premised upon the debtor's
cooperation in the "bankruptcy bargain." In exchange for a discharge of
certain debts, the debtor is expected to cooperate with creditors and the
bankruptcy trustee in the collection and liquidation of the assets of the
bankruptcy estate.' An essential part of cooperation is providing
information Honesty and complete disclosure of relevant information
are necessary components of a successful bankruptcy case, which
maximizes the value available to pay the claims of all creditors to justify
giving the individual debtor a "fresh start."3 This Note explores the level
of scrutiny that an individual debtor must submit to as part of the
bankruptcy bargain.
Given the disclosure requirements imposed upon individual debtors
by the Bankruptcy Code,' a debtor cannot reasonably expect to retain
the same level of privacy inside of bankruptcy as out.' The level of an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy becomes a key issue when
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005; recipient of the
American Bankruptcy Institute's 2004 Medal of Excellence.
i. See Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Franklin (In re Franklin), 179 B.R. 913, 927 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. I995) (stating that the debtor failed to live up to "his end of the 'bankruptcy bargain' by fully,
candidly, and completely disclosing all his financial affairs and debts"); Larry Bates, Excepting Credit
Card Debt From Discharge in Bankruptcy: Why Fraud Can't Mean What the Courts Want it to Mean,
78 N.D. L. REv. 23, 27 (2002); Richard E. Coulson, Substantial Abuse of Bankruptcy Code Section
7o7(b): An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Need, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. Rvrr. 261, 262 (1998).
2. Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 417 n.it (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) ("A
debtor's complete disclosure is essential to the proper administration of the bankruptcy estate.")
(quoting Cohen v. McElroy (In re McElroy), 229 B.R. 483,488 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998)).
3. J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213,308-09 (199).
4. Title is of the United States Code.
5. See In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 414; see also infra note 33.
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the bankruptcy trustee is seeking to force a greater amount of disclosure
on the part of the debtor than is explicitly required under the Code-by
requesting a search warrant to search the debtor's home for assets of the
bankruptcy estate, for example. Bankruptcy jurisprudence has developed
in such a way to establish a subtle balance between the privacy interests
of debtors and the general interest in fair administration of bankruptcy
cases upon which the bankruptcy bargain depends. Only one court has
gone so far as to completely subordinate an individual debtor's right to
privacy to the public's interest in a fair administration of bankruptcy
cases. 6 In In re Barman, the court upset the historical balance by holding
that whatever expectation of privacy remained after filing a bankruptcy
is effectively outweighed by the general public interest in access to
information.7
While a debtor's reasonable expectation of privacy is significantly
reduced upon filing a bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy bargain does
not expressly nor implicitly require a debtor to waive his right to privacy.8
An individual debtor's expectation of privacy is not so diminished upon
filing a petition in bankruptcy as to allow a trustee to unnecessarily delve
into that debtor's personal-as opposed to financial-interests or to
allow a trustee's application for a search warrant to survive Fourth
Amendment analysis.' Apart from the heightened expectation of privacy
in one's home that has been recognized by the Supreme Court under the
Fourth Amendment for all individuals, the constitutional rights of
individual debtors are consistently protected in bankruptcy proceedings
and are uniformly distinguished from the rights of corporate and business
debtors, which are more freely waiveable by a trustee in bankruptcy."
Moreover, in the aftermath of bankruptcy reform, which provided
complete access to bankruptcy court documents via the Internet,
Congress has demonstrated a clear concern regarding the impingement
on debtors' privacy that resulted from the new system and has
subsequently demonstrated a clear intent to restrict such effect." Actions
taken by all three branches of government demonstrate that society is
6. See In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 414.
7. See id. at 417.
8. Id. at 414.
9. Id. at 415.
so. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
ii. In 1999, Congress announced a policy to make electronically-collected court documents
available to the public electronically. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, io6th Cong. § 703
(1999). Additionally, chapter trustees have created the National Data Center to establish a centralized
system for easily accessing all trustees' case files. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. Prior to
this general change in policy, one had to appear at the courthouse to inspect publicly available court
records. See infra notes 6o and 61 and accompanying text. When the potential threat of such a policy to
the privacy interests of debtors became clear, Congress and the President began ameliorative action.
See infra Part V.
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not prepared to recognize as reasonable a condition of the bankruptcy
bargain that requires individual debtors to surrender rights to privacy."
In Part I of this Note, I will discuss the holding of Barman, which has
upset the historical balance of interests in bankruptcy proceedings. In
Part II, I link Barman to a possible developing trend as illustrated by the
almost concurrent passage of The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999. In
Part III, I set forth the criticism of the rationale underlying Barman and
The Bankruptcy Reform Act. In Part IV, I examine the balance that
existed prior to Barman and which undermines the argument that a
debtor relinquishes all expectation of privacy upon filing a bankruptcy
petition. Finally, in Part V, I demonstrate the most recent political efforts
to restore the balance between privacy interests and interests in the fair
administration of bankruptcy cases in recognition of and reaffirming an
individual debtor's reasonable expectation of privacy.
I. IN RE BARMAN: A CASE STUDY ON DEBTORS' PRIVACY
The propriety of a search of the debtor's residence in In re Barman
purportedly presented an issue of first impression for the Bankruptcy
Court of the Eastern District of Michigan in 2000."3 Barman stands for
the proposition that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an
expectation of privacy for an individual who has filed a bankruptcy
petition. 4
In Barman, the chapter 7 trustee had reason to believe the individual
debtor made several fraudulent transfers and was physically hiding assets
of the bankruptcy estate in his home.'5 While the debtor scheduled only
$500 of wearing apparel, the trustee alleged that Barman purchased two
houses using his parents' names within two years of filing his bankruptcy
petition. 6 In addition, the debtor's wife purchased two additional houses
and two new vehicles within one year of the commencement of the
bankruptcy case. 7 The trustee further alleged that the debtor and his
wife were not forthright during his investigation of the case in that they
provided false testimony and failed to adequately maintain financial
records." The trustee offered testimony of a process server who observed
12. The Fourth Amendment balancing test inquires as to whether a particular expectation of
privacy is one that "society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; see also
infra notes 29-31 , and i05-io7 and accompanying text.
13. See In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 407, 411. But see In re Application of a Trustee in Bankruptcy
for a Search Warrant, 173 B.R. 341 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (considering validity of trustee's application for
search warrant six years before Barman); Wade v. Smith, No. IP 88-65 -C, 1991 WL 504873 (S.D. Ind.
May 30, 19) (allowing Fourth Amendment claim regarding trustee's search to go forward).
14. See In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 420.
15. Id. at 4o7.
i6. Id. at 407-08.
17. Id. at 4o8-Io.
i8. Id. at 409. Specifically, the debtor's wife first denied having business interests that she later
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possible bankruptcy estate assets in the debtor's garage.'9
The trustee filed an ex parte motion seeking authorization to enter
the debtor's residence and "to inspect, inventory and appraise personal
property."2" In addition to the above factual grounds, the trustee asserted
various provisions of Title I I as legal grounds for authorization. In
particular, the trustee referenced § 542, which requires the debtor to turn
over property of the bankruptcy estate, and § 704, which requires the
trustee to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.2 By acting
fraudulently, in the trustee's opinion, the debtor did not satisfy his duty
under the Code and hindered the trustee's duty to investigate.2 The
trustee pointed to the "probable existence" of property of the
bankruptcy estate and determined the search was "necessary to avoid
irreparable harm to the bankruptcy estate.
' '
21
The bankruptcy court granted the search order, and the debtor
appealed to suppress the evidence taken during the trustee's search,
arguing that the inspection was a general warrant that violated his Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 24 The Fourth
Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 5
In determining the constitutionality of the trustee's inspection, the
court addressed whether a trustee is bound by the Fourth Amendment,
and if so, whether the trustee's inspection violated Fourth Amendment
admitted having. Second, she denied purchasing a business, but the trustee presented a copy of a check
that she used to make a down payment. Finally, she denied that the debtor was involved in purchasing
the business, but the trustee presented a UCC financing statement signed by the debtor. Id.
Ultimately, the debtor was denied a discharge of his debts in this case for failure to adequately
maintain financial records. The court was particularly concerned that the debtor could not adequately
explain the loss of $130,000, proceeds from refinancing one of the newly purchased houses. The debtor
violated a court order in the bankruptcy proceeding of the debtor's business and was found in
contempt for the refinancing. Id. at 408. As an aside, the debtor's parents were also denied a discharge
in their bankruptcy case for their part in the refinancing. Id.
I9. Id.
20. Id. at 407. The trustee's typical remedies in cases such as this include a voidable preference
action under ii U.S.C. § 547, a fraudulent transfer action under § 548, or a denial of discharge under
§ 727. The United States Trustee can bring an action under § 707 for substantial abuse. The United
States Attorney may also choose to prosecute the debtor for the crime of bankruptcy fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
21. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 407; see II U.S.C. §§ 542, 704 (2000).
22. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 407.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4I0-I.
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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standards. 6
Preliminarily, the court concluded that the trustee's inspection was
conduct fairly attributable to the government for purposes of applying
the Fourth Amendment, acknowledging but disregarding authority to the
contrary." In so holding, the court relied primarily on I I U.S.C. § 704
and 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e), which establishes a district court's exclusive
jurisdiction over the debtor's property in bankruptcy, and upon several
other provisions to demonstrate that status as a trustee is "sufficiently
close to the government. ,28
Having determined that the trustee was bound by the Fourth
Amendment, the court turned to the constitutionality of the trustee's
actions. The Fourth Amendment standard relied on by the court was one
of reasonableness; the standards of reasonableness in a civil context,
however, are less stringent than in a criminal context." The court relied
on the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States
in stating that "the fourth amendment is intended to protect an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 3° Consequently, to
determine whether the trustee's inspection was reasonable, the court
found it necessary to consider "first the extent to which a debtor's
expectation of privacy in his residence is one that 'society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable."' 3 ' The court engaged in a balancing of
interests -weighing the debtor's interest against the public interest-
effectively determining the debtor's right to privacy in a bankruptcy
proceeding."
It was "fundamentally" clear to the court that debtors have a
26. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 41I; see Mechele Dickerson, Using Criminal Law Remedies to
Unearth Hidden Assets, io J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 541, 542-53 (20o1) [hereinafter Dickerson I.
27. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 412 (acknowledging In re Application of a Trustee in Bankruptcy
for a Search Warrant, 173 B.R. 341 (N.D. Ohio I994), in which the court refused to grant the trustee's
application for a search warrant after concluding that the trustee was a private actor). But see In re
Hughes Drilling Company, 75 B.R. 196, 197 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987) ("The trustee is a
representative of the estate, not an officer, agent, or instrumentality of the United States.")
28. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 412. The court stated:
These provisions establish that the chapter 7 trustee is appointed and supervised by an
official of the Department of Justice, the United States Trustee. See Is U.S.C. § 701(a)(I);
28 U.S.C. §§ 581, 586(a)(I), 586(a)(5) and 586(c); 28 C.F.R. § 58.4 (1999). The United States
Trustee has the authority to remove a trustee from the panel of trustees. 28 C.F.R. § 58.6;
Joelson v. United States, 86 F.3d 1413 (6th Cir. 1996). The court may remove a trustee in a
particular case "for cause." iI U.S.C. § 324(a). The trustee's fees in a case are subject to
approval by the court. Il U.S.C. § 326(a). A trustee may hire an attorney or other
professionals only with the approval of the court. I I U.S.C. § 327(a).
29. Id. at 413 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I
(1968); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
30. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,36o (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
31. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
32. Id. at 413-19; see Mechele Dickerson, Can the "Public Interest" Justify Non-Consensual
Searches of Homes in Bankruptcy Cases?, II WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 267, 289 (2oo2) [hereinafter
Dickerson II].
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"significantly reduced expectation of privacy," and "the reduced
expectation of privacy is a natural consequence of the substantial and
detailed disclosures that are inherent in the bankruptcy process."33 The
court conceded the possibility that a debtor may retain some expectation
of privacy for three reasons. First, although filed documents are available
to the public, the home generally is not.4 Second, an obligation to allow
an inspection without a court order is not among the debtor's statutory
duties.35 Third, even though the debtor's personal property automatically
becomes property of the bankruptcy estate under Ii U.S.C. § 541,
usually property reverts to the individual debtor.6 Nevertheless, the
court's conclusion that the debtor maintains some reasonable
expectation of privacy in his residence was not determinative of the issue.
The court proceeded to weigh the debtor's significantly reduced
expectation of privacy against the interests of the trustee and the public
in an inspection of the debtor's residence. Factors in the balancing test
include: a long history of judicial and public acceptance, need to inspect
for the public good, and the non-personal, non-criminal nature of the
intrusion." First analyzing the need to inspect, the court cited the
"trustee's general statutory obligation to marshal and account for all
property of the estate."39 The court suggested that, in some cases, an
inspection may be the only tool by which the trustee can fulfill his
33. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 414. In particular, debtors are required to file with the court "a list
of creditors.... a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and expenditures, and
a statement of financial affairs." ii U.S.C. § 52I(1) (20oo); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(I). The debtor
must describe personal property. See Official Form 6, schedule B. All documents that the debtor files
with the court are publicly accessible at the court clerk's office and are now available on the internet
via PacerNet at http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov. See infra Part I1.
34. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 414.
35. According to the court, obligations to file detailed disclosures under ii U.S.C. § 521(1)
(2000), to appear for examination at the § 341 meeting of creditors under § 343, to surrender property
of the estate under § 521(4), and to cooperate with the trustee for reasons listed under § 521(3), or a
general obligation to cooperate with the trustee do not amount to an obligation to allow the trustee to
inspect the debtor's residence. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 414-15. But these obligations significantly
reduce the debtor's reasonable expectation of privacy, which is then weighed against the significant
public interest in fair administration of bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 414-17.
36. Id. at 415. An individual debtor is generally permitted to exempt specific property from being
distributed to creditors as part of the bankruptcy estate. II U.S.C. § 522 (2000). The trustee may also
choose to abandon debtors' property that is of insignificant monetary value to the estate, for example
family photos. See ii U.S.C. § 542 (2000).
37. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 416. The court relied primarily on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 534 (1967), in which the Supreme Court held that an administrative fire inspection was a
significant intrusion upon protected interests for which a warrant must be obtained, and Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (I971), in which the Court held that a caseworker's visit with notice but
without a warrant was constitutional.
38. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 416; Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-37; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318.
39. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 416 (citing ii U.S.C. § 704 (20o0)). The need is particularly great
when the trustee has reason to believe the debtor is concealing assets of the estate or the trustee is
objecting to the debtor's discharge. Id.
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statutory duties.' An inspection may also be necessary in order for the
debtor to satisfy his end of the bankruptcy bargain. In addition to the
trustee, the general public-not just the parties in interest-has an
interest in the "full and proper administration of a bankruptcy case."'
Significant to the court, the inspection was for administrative, rather than
criminal, purposes.43 The inspection would be an "ordinary part of the
judicial and administrative processes of bankruptcy"' similar to the
warrantless social worker's visit in Wyman v. James, which the Supreme
Court held constitutional. 5 For these reasons, the trustee's inspection
was held to be reasonable. 6
The court relied heavily upon the idea that the "bankruptcy
bargain" requires the debtor to fully cooperate and provide complete
disclosure in order for the debtor to obtain discharge. This outcome is
striking, however, because, as discussed in greater detail in Parts III and
IV, the bankruptcy bargain has never before been turned into a key that
unlocks the front door of a debtor's home. Years of bankruptcy
jurisprudence, in which the competing interests analyzed in Barman had
certainly been entertained, resulted in a careful balance between the
interest in fair administration of the bankruptcy estate and individual
debtors' privacy interests. Under this previous balance, a trustee had
40. Id. at 417.
41. See id.
Given the bankruptcy process by which a debtor receives a discharge of debts in return for
cooperating with the trustee, disclosing all assets and giving up all non-exempt assets, the
trustee's inspection of the debtor's residence may, in a particular case, be a crucial part of
the process and therefore a matter of substantial need.
Id. Without going so far as to require debtors to submit to residence inspections, other courts have
recognized the importance of full disclosure and cooperation by the debtor. See, e.g., In re Sochia, 231
B.R. 158 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing debtor's case where debtor failed to appear at § 341
meeting of creditors); In re Hyde, 222 B.R. 214 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying debtor's motion to
quash trustee's subpoena issued pursuant to § 521(4)); Cohen v. McElroy (In re McElroy), 229 B.R.
483 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (denying debtor's discharge where information provided in statement of
affairs and schedules was false); Garcia v. Coombs (In re Coombs), 193 B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1996) (denying debtor's discharge where debtor failed to list all assets in schedules).
42. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 417 (citing In re Dougherty v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.,
631 F. Supp. 1566, 1571 (E.D. Mich. 1986)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Wyman v. James, 4oo U.S. 309,326 (1971).
46. In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 420. The court proceeded to detail inspection procedures that
satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 418. Finally, the court rejected the debtor's general warrant
argument because the inspection order complied with the detailed inspection procedures, identified
the premises to be inspected, and authorized only an inspection-not seizure. Id. at 418-19. Consider
first, however, the inspection order did not specify a particular part of the home to be searched,
leaving every nook open to scrutiny, and second, the possibility that availability of residence
inspections as a new tool will lead trustees to perform a greater number of searches to strengthen
subsequent bankruptcy crime proceedings. Risk results because the elements of fraudulent
conveyance are the same as those of criminal bankruptcy fraud. Dickerson I, supra note 26, at 556; see
also supra note 20; infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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never been allowed complete access to a debtors' home and invasions
upon non-financial interests were, highly scrutinized. " Barman shifted
this balance.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1999
Regardless of the historical balance, Barman may be an indication of
a larger trend demanding greater transparency of debtors in bankruptcy.
At around the same time of the Barman decision, The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1999 called for sweeping changes to the manner in which
bankruptcy documents are accessed. Specifically, The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1999 called for bankruptcy information to be collected
and made available on a national level." Title VII of the bill states that
"the national policy should be that: (I) all public-record data held in
electronic form by bankruptcy clerks should be released in electronic
form in bulk to the public."49 Moreover, most bankruptcy courts now
participate in a case management system called Case
Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF). 0 At the Public Access to
Electronic Records (PACER) web site, anyone surfing the web can
obtain a login name and access to debtors' financial and personal
information.5'
The information accessible via the Internet includes all documents
filed with the bankruptcy court. To initiate a bankruptcy case, the
individual debtor files a petition and must complete a schedule of assets
and liabilities and a statement regarding the debtor's financial affairs."
47. E.g., Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the debtor's allegations
regarding warrantless entry of home and seizure of personal property sufficient to state a Fourth
Amendment claim); In re Application of a Trustee in Bankruptcy for a Search Warrant, 173 B.R. 341
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (rejecting a trustee's application for a search warrant); Wade v. Smith, No. IP 88-65-
C, i99i WL 504873, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May 30, i991) (allowing Fourth Amendment claim regarding
trustee's search to go forward and stating, "[a] bankrupt does not relinquish all Fourth Amendment
protections upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition").
48. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, Io6th Cong. § 703 (I999); Richard Lauter, Privacy
Concerns and Safeguards in the Governmental Dissemination of Bankruptcy Data on the Internet, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., May 19, 2ooo, at io; see supra note i i.
49. H.R. 833 § 703; see also Lauter, supra note 48; infra notes 50, 5t and accompanying text.
50. As of May 2003, CM/ECF contained more than 6 million cases with over 15 million
documents. Do debtors retain privacy rights? ABI panel examines privacy issues in bankruptcy setting,
CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, May 1, 2003, at i [hereinafter Do debtors retain privacy rights?].
51. Peter C. Alexander & Kelly Jo Slone, Thinking about the Private Matters in Public
Documents: Bankruptcy Privacy in an Electronic Age, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 437, 437 (2OOl); Joseph A.
Guzinski, Protecting Financial Information in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June
19, 2000, at 16 [hereinafter Guzinski I]; Lauter, supra note 48, at io; Do Debtors Retain Privacy
Rights?, supra note 5o. The National PACER site is located at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov.
Additionally, nearly all trustees now maintain an electronic database of their cases. Prior to
bankruptcy reform, access to trustee files was available only on a "trustee-by-trustee" basis. Guzinski
I, supra. Creation of a National Data Center now provides centralized access to trustees' files for
creditors. See id. at 16-17; Do debtors retain privacy rights?, supra note 50; see also supra note i i.
52. II U.S.C. § 521(l) (2ooo). Also consider the information required of creditors. Each must file
[Vol. 56:609
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Liabilities and assets may include other legal proceedings in which the
debtor is currently involved or, medical .bills for treatment recently
received. 3 The petition schedules and statements include descriptions of
the debtor's assets, their value, and location; debts owed, the amount, to
whom, and why; the source and amount of the debtor's income and how
it is spent. 4 Insurance policies and annuities must be valued and policy
numbers disclosed. Credit card-related debts must be itemized, and the
debtor must provide the name and address of the bank or credit union as
well as the account number.55 The statements require information
regarding the debtor's residences and employment for the three years
prior to filing the petition. 6 The schedule of current income requires
names and ages of the debtor's dependents. 7 These documents may also
reveal information regarding the debtor's medical history and religious
affiliations.: Finally, all of this information is organized and related to
the debtor by use of his or her social security number. 9
A right to inspect documents filed in bankruptcy cases already
existed under ii U.S.C. § Io7(a). 6° Nevertheless, "practical barriers"
effectively limited access to the sensitive information contained in court
filings.' Internet access shortens the length of time this process takes to
mere seconds, effectively increasing access.
The proponents of The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 advance six
arguments in support of greater access. First, public access casts harsh
a proof of claim and attach to the proof of claim specific information to substantiate the claim. Mary J.
Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y IOII, Io65 (2000).
53. Lauter, supra note 48, at Io.
54. Joseph A. Guzinski, Government's Emerging Role As a Source of Empirical Information in
Bankruptcy Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 17, 1998, at 8 [hereinafter Guzinski II].
55. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, STUDY OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY AND BANKRUPTCY, 14 (2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/privacylBnkrStdyoii6oi.htm [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY STUDY];
Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at 1O2O.
56. Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at 1020.
57. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 14.
58. Alexander & Slone, supra note 5I , at 438; Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at 1072.
59. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 14; Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An
Overview of Legislation and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal
Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 543 (1998); Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at
1020, Io66.
6o. Section Io7(a) reads, "a paper filed in a case under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy
court are public records and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge." I I
U.S.C. § 107(a) (2000).
61. Lauter, supra note 48, at io (citing BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTr YEARS, NAT'L BANKR.
REV. COMM'N FINAL REPORT, 932 (1997))
Today nearly all information in court files is open to the public. However, access requires
citizens to appear at the courthouse, wait in long lines, request the papers, wait for them to
be found in the files and then inspect them in the courthouse. Making photocopies often
requires waiting in additional lines and using coin-operated copying machines.
February 2005]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
scrutiny over the bankruptcy system, forcing accountability and
integrity.62 Second, forced accountability through public -access promotes
confidence and trust in the bankruptcy system. Third, public access
provides answers to empirical questions in order to accurately assess and
improve the bankruptcy system.4 Fourth, with access to bankruptcy
information, lenders can make better-informed decisions, improving
credit market efficiency. 65 Fifth, creditors, as parties in interest, need
access to protect their interests in the bankruptcy estate.66 Finally,
trustees and other law enforcement officials need comprehensive access
in order prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system and ensure that all
claims that can be paid are settled. 67
These arguments can be recognized as those underlying the court's
decision in Barman. The Barman court explicitly noted the "strong
public interest in the full and proper administration of a bankruptcy
case."6s Without detailing what the public interest entails, the court stated
that such public interest "goes well beyond the private interests of the
62. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 20; Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at io69. The first
three arguments are viewed as relating to a more general public interest in exercising the public "right
to know" and controlling government processes. In context, public access to bankruptcy court records
allows the public to act as a monitor. That function ensures accountability and fairness, promotes
understanding, and reduces injustice and incompetence. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 29;
Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at Io7o.
63. See discussion and sources cited supra note 62.
64. Guzinski II, supra note 54, at 8; Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at io69; Bankruptcy Bills Still
Stuck: Bankruptcy and Privacy Issues Study Set, NAT'L Assoc. OF ATTORNEYs GEN. BANKR. BULLETIN,
July 20O0, at I [hereinafter Privacy Issues]; see also supra note 62. Bankruptcy reform may be
hampered by or rendered less effective by lack of reliable answer to empirical questions regarding the
number of successful chapter I I petitions or the amounts that individuals were able to repay creditors,
for example. Consequently, the "lack of data has itself become the object of reform." Ideally, reform
would effectively create a centralized database of bankruptcy information for an easily accessible
source of answers to empirical questions. Guzinski II, supra note 54, at 8; Privacy Issues, supra note 64,
at I.
65. Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at IO69-7 o . This argument reflects commercial interest in
using available bankruptcy information, particularly that information relevant to the credit industry,
for purposes outside of the bankruptcy case. See id.
66. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 19-20; Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at 1070. The fifth
and sixth arguments are structural concerns related to the effective functioning of the bankruptcy
system as explicitly set forth in the Code. Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at IO7o. Specifically,
creditors use information to file proofs of claim and ultimately receive a dividend on its share of the
debtor's property, and or object to debtors' discharge, if necessary. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55,
at 19-20.
67. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 19-20; Lisa Hill Fenning, 21st Century Trustees, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1999, at 28; George J. Wallace, Consumer Bankruptcy Developments, 17 S&P's
THE REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICE 107 (May 16, 2ooi); see also supra note 66. Not only
does access allow the trustee to uncover, in a cost-effective manner, misconduct by the debtor and
object to discharge, but complete information also allows the trustee to recover property of the
bankruptcy estate that may have been fraudulently transferred to others. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra
note 55, at i9-20.
68. Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403,417 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
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individual creditors whose claims are discharged through the process," 69
thereby demonstrating the court's awareness of the impact of the
bankruptcy system on the economy at a higher level. Nevertheless,
awareness of this relationship is not new, nor does it lessen the
importance of the other side of the equation: individual privacy interests.
Moreover, privacy interests also have a meaning at a level higher than
the bankruptcy case itself. The remainder of this Note criticizes those
arguments that fail to properly weigh privacy interests of individual
debtors in balancing those interests against greater transparency and
access to information in bankruptcy.
III. CRITICISM OF THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING BARMAN AND
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1999
The Barman decision and its underlying rationale have suffered
from passionate criticism.7" In particular, in In re Truck-A-Way, a 2003
decision from the District Court of the Eastern District of California, a
debtor sought removal of the trustee's counsel for violations of ethical
and professional standards resulting from the counsel's application for
and execution of an "Ex Parte Application for Order Authorizing the
Immediate Entry, Search and Seizure of Property."7' The issue of
whether the "type of orders approved by In re Barman are permissible
under the Fourth Amendment" was not before the court.72 Regardless,
the court stated that it "strongly disagrees with In re Barman's
interpretation of a bankruptcy court's authority under the Fourth
Amendment,"73 and the counsel sought the search and seizure order in
"direct contravention of the Fourth Amendment."74
Although crafted in terms of a civil "search and seizure order," the
court asserted that the Fourth Amendment and Federal Rules of
69. Id.
70. Spacone v. Burke (In re Truck-A-Way), 3oo B.R. 31, 38 (E.D. Cal. 2oo3); Dickerson 1, supra
note 26; Dickerson II, supra note 32; Brandy Kuretich, Bankruptcy and the Fourth Amendment:
Should the Test Be "Reasonable" or "Administrative?", 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 31 (2OO3).
71. In re Truck-A-Way, 3oo B.R. at 32-33. The search targeted property in Las Vegas, Nevada,
and Palm Desert, California, that counsel alleged belonged to the bankruptcy estate. The order
permitted the counsel to "immediately enter" the debtor's residences, "picking or re-keying the door
locks if necessary," seize items of the estate, and search "the persons and personal effects of any
person at the premises or who arrives at the premises while the search of the premises is being
conducted." Id. at 33. Only the debtor's wife and children were home when the search occurred. Id. at
34. The court noted that the counsel searched the debtor's bedroom and dressers and found items
"that suggested intimacy." Id. Not only did the counsel exceed the scope of the search and seizure
authorization by searching and seizing title to two vehicles, but the counsel seized, inspected, and
retained documents subject to attorney-client privilege despite the debtor's express assertion of the
privilege. Id. at 34-35. Moreover, the order authorizing search of Nevada property likely exceeded the
California bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Id. at 35.
72. Id. at 38 n.13.
73. Id. at 38.
74. Id. at 36.
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Criminal Procedure continued to apply.75 Relying on the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the court explained that a
search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless authorized
by a valid search warrant.76 In applying Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41, which sets forth the procedure for seeking and issuing a
valid search warrant, the court focused on the requirements that a search
warrant be issued to a "federal law enforcement officer or attorney for
the government" to search and seize evidence or instrumentalities of a
"crime" by a federal magistrate judge with "authority" in the district.
Here, the court relied on the decision in In re Application of a Trustee in
Bankruptcy for a Search Warrant as precedent for the proposition that a
bankruptcy judge does not possess such authority." Contrary to the
counsel's suggestion that i i U.S.C. § I05(a) gives a bankruptcy judge the
authority to issue a warrantless search and seizure order, in In re
Application, the court denied the trustee's application for a search
warrant to locate assets of the bankruptcy estate, on the grounds that a
trustee is neither a law enforcement officer nor an attorney for the
government and did not otherwise show he had the authority to apply for
a search warrant." Moreover, the In re Application court reasoned that,
to the extent that the trustee's allegations of concealed bankruptcy estate
assets showed or tended to show that a bankruptcy crime occurred, the
United States Attorney's Office and federal law enforcement agencies,
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, had the responsibility for
investigating such illegal activity. 79 That court determined that trustees
"must call matters of which they may have knowledge to the attention of
these officials."' In light of this analysis, the Truck-A-Way court
concluded the counsel's circumvention of the Fourth Amendment's
exacting mandate and unequivocal protection had "no basis in the
Constitution, federal statutes, or case law."'
Like the Truck-A-Way court, several scholars have identified flaws
in Barman. Preliminarily, the Barman court should have recognized that
parties in commercial civil litigation-even if a government entity is a
75. Id. at 37. The Barman court coined its search authorization as an "inspection order." Taunt v.
Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 420 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000). But cf. In re Application, 173
B.R. 341, 342 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (denying the trustee's application for a "search warrant").
76. In re Truck-A-Way, 300 B.R. at 37 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).
77. Id. at 37-38 (discussing In re Application).
78. In re Application, t73 B.R. at 342. The text of ii U.S.C. §to5(a) reads, in part, "[tihe court
may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this title."
79. In re Application, 173 B.R. at 342. Note the Barman court's assertion that "the trustee's
inspection is not for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime." In re Barman, 252 B.R. at 417; see
infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
8o. In re Application, 173 B.R. at 342.
8i. In re Truck-A-Way, 300 B.R. at 36.
IVol. 56:6o9
SOME BARGAIN
litigant-have no right to search their adversaries' homes if they fail to
produce discovery.2 Recourse may be had in that situation in the form of
sanctions or a dismissal."' In the bankruptcy context, the court could deny
the debtor a discharge of its debts or refer the debtor to the United
States Trustee for a bankruptcy fraud investigation. 4 That potential for
bankruptcy fraud criminal prosecution, however, suggests another
weakness in the Barman logic. Although the court carefully clarified that
any warrant "will not authorize any 'seizure' of any property" and the
"inspection is not for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime," it
was noted that "presumably any such evidence [would] be turned over to
the United States Attorney as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a), or to the
United States Trustee so that the United States Trustee can then notify
the United States Attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(F)., 85 In fact,
one could argue that nearly all fraudulent conveyance actions lead to
potential criminal liability given the similarities between the elements of
a fraudulent conveyance and bankruptcy fraud.8
The primary point of contention that has been previously raised is
that the Barman court failed to properly weigh the greater protection
afforded to homes as opposed to other venues under the Fourth
Amendment."' Searches of homes, even if pursuant to a warrant, are
carefully scrutinized.8 Moreover, warrantless searches of homes are
presumptively unreasonable." Although the Supreme Court has
permitted warrantless administrative searches in certain limited
82. See Dickerson II, supra note 32, at 294-95.
83. See id. at 295.
84. Id. at 3o1-o2; see also II U.S.C. § 727 (2ooo) (denial of discharge); 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2ooo)
(bankruptcy fraud).
85. Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 417, 418 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 200o) (italics
removed).
86. See Dickerson I, supra note 26, at 556. To prove a fraudulent transfer, the trustee must show
that the debtor (i) transferred (or incurred a debt) (2) property of the estate (3) within one year of the
petition (4) with the intent to hinder or for less than reasonably equivalent value, and (5) was insolvent
at the time of the transaction, was left unreasonably small capital afterward, or intended to incur debts
beyond his or her ability to pay. I I U.S.C. § 548(a)(i) (2ooo). To prove the crime of bankruptcy fraud,
the United States Attorney can prove, inter alia, that the debtor (i) knowingly and fraudulently
concealed assets of the estate; (2) knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath in connection with the
bankruptcy case; (3) knowingly and fraudulently made a false statement under penalty of perjury in
connection with the bankruptcy case; (4) knowingly and fraudulently presented a false claim; (7)
knowingly and fraudulently concealed assets in contemplation of the bankruptcy case; (8) after the
commencement of the case, knowingly and fraudulently destroys, conceals, or makes a false entry in
any recorded information regarding property or financial affairs of a debtor; or (9) after the
commencement of the case, knowingly and fraudulently withholds recorded information regarding the
financial information of the debtor. 18 U.S.C. § 152(t)-(4), (7)-(9) (2ooo).
87. See Dickerson II, supra note 32, at 271.
88. See id. at 272 (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520U.S. 385 (997) (scrutinizing an authorized
search)).
89. See id. at 269 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2oo) (stating that, with few
exceptions, warrantless search of home presumed unreasonable)).
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circumstances if needed to protect public health and safety, bankruptcy
cases rarely implicate such concerns.' Consequently, in balancing
interests, a trustee's need to inspect an individual debtor's home should
not outweigh the intrusion into the debtor's home, which is highly
protected under the Fourth Amendment." Whereas administrative
searches are typically carefully limited to investigations in which little
likelihood of criminal prosecution exists," as noted, the likelihood of
criminal prosecution for bankruptcy fraud is high.93 Debtors might
reasonably expect their financial records to be inspected by creditors, the
trustee, and the bankruptcy court, but that expectation does not
contemplate that "anyone other than law enforcement officers will
scrutinize the contents of their personal residences."'
On the other hand, consider the argument that by voluntarily
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, a debtor
has surrendered the above expectation.95 In exchange for the protection
of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor has a duty to cooperate with the
trustee.9 The trustee's ability to deny a discharge to those debtors who
do not cooperate is an inefficient "rear-view" approach that places a high
burden on trustees to pursue causes of action after a case is closed.' A
90. See id. at 292-93. In Camara v. Municipal Court, an inspector from the Department of Public
Health attempted to enter an apartment to perform a routine inspection for violations of the city's
Housing Code. 387 U.S. 523, 525-26 (1967). The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that "except
in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." Id. at 528-29. Although the
type of inspection was "less hostile" than one conducted for a criminal investigation, "even the most
law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity
of his home may be broken." Id. at 530-31. Moreover, even an administrative search could lead to a
criminal complaint. Id. at 531. The Court held that administrative searches of the kind at issue were
significant intrusions upon protected interests by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 534. Nevertheless, the
Court determined that in certain circumstances, the public need for inspection may outweigh private
interests. Id. at 539. Contrast Camara with Wyman v. James, in which home visits conducted to
determine a family's eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (197i). The search was reasonable because the
public had a strong interest in protecting dependent children, and the visits were announced,
emphasized privacy, and not for the purposes of investigating crimes. Id. at 3 18, 320-23.
91. See Dickerson I, supra note 26, at 553-54.
92. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1978) (stating that the government must
seek criminal search warrant to gather evidence for criminal prosecution); Wyman, 400 U.S. at 323
("The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and...
is not in aid of any criminal prosecution.").
93. See Dickerson I, supra note 26, at 556; see also supra notes 84-86.
94. Dickerson I, supra note 26, at 553.
95. See Kuretich, supra note 7o, at 32.
96. See id. at 33; It U.S.C. § 521(3) (2000) ("The debtor shall... cooperate with the trustee as
necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title .... ).
97. See Kuretich, supra note 70, at 38. The characterization of this power as "rear-view" is
arguably inaccurate. Indeed, the trustee might commence an adversary proceeding during the
bankruptcy case. Moreover, the possibility of facing an adversary proceeding, the result of which could
be a denial of discharge, seems to present a great incentive to cooperate with the trustee and avoid this
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more efficient administrative approach would give trustees the power to
use administrative searches to inventory and appraise all debtors' assets
in the interest of the bankruptcy estate." Such power would be in line
with the administrative searches allowed under the Fourth Amendment
for two reasons.' First, administrative search exceptions, rather than
being focused on criminal prosecution, are aimed at enforcing regulatory
schemes similar to the Bankruptcy Code."° Second, a special need to
inspect exists in order to combat bankruptcy fraud and abuse, bringing
credibility to the bankruptcy system and avoiding the discharge of
millions of dollars of debt that debtors had the ability to repay."' The
public has a strong interest in the negative impact that a faulty
bankruptcy system has on the economy."° Given this depiction of the
catastrophic effect of bankruptcy abuse, one could argue that Barman
does not go far enough. The debtor's general obligation to disclose
property under ii U.S.C. § 521(0) should be construed to require home
inspections."° Moreover, the "overly burdensome" search procedures
outlined in Barman should be relaxed to permit trustees to conduct
searches with "minimal court involvement" such that the trustee is
required to seek court involvement only when a debtor refuses to
cooperate. Even in that case, the court's involvement would be "limited
to compelling cooperation and not analyzing the trustee's basis for
conflict altogether, thereby creating a more efficient process that avoids the costs associated with
seeking and executing an inspection.
98. See id at 38-39.
99. See id. at 45, 48-49.
Ioo. See id. at 45. Kuretich compares a debtor to a probationer in that both have a reduced
expectation of privacy, and the trustee's goal, like that of the probation officer, is to help rehabilitate
the subject of the investigation. Id. at 48 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987) (holding
warrantless search of probationer's home to be reasonable)).
Los. See id. at 48-49.
io2. See id. at 49-50. Kuretich compares searching for bankruptcy abuse to suspicionless drug
testing. Id. at 50-54. Even though the Supreme Court rejected a particular testing scheme in Chandler
v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997), the factors the Court applied there may point to a different
conclusion in the bankruptcy context. Kuretich, supra note 70, at 52. The Court considered "i)
whether the individual had a diminished expectation of privacy; 2) whether there were public safety
issues involved; 3) the intrusiveness of the search; and 4) whether the element of surprise was
necessary to achieve the deterrent effect sought." Kuretich, supra note 70, at 5o-54. (citing Chandler,
520 U.S. at 315-17). In a bankruptcy context, the argument goes, (i) a debtor has a reduced
expectation of privacy because all his possessions are assets of the bankruptcy estate for at least some
period of time; (2) returning credibility to the bankruptcy system and improving its impact on the
economy provide reasons beyond public safety to uncover abuse; (3) although intrusive, the potential
to correct abuse and prevent economic erosion are of sufficient importance to warrant conducting the
search; and (4) surprise is crucial so the debtor cannot take further measures to hide assets and hinder
the trustee. Id. at 52-53.
103. See Kuretich, supra note 70, at 56. Section 521(1) reads: "The debtor shall file a list of
creditors, and unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of
current income and expenditures, and a statement of the debtor's financial affairs ..... "i U.S.C.
§ 521(1) (2000).
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requesting the search."' 4
The remainder of this Note illustrates the infirmities of Barman and
the above criticisms. An open invitation to search an individual debtor's
home is not a condition of the bankruptcy bargain. The traditional strict
protection afforded private homes only provides part of the justification.
The Barman court, itself, identified the appropriate test: the basic
concern is reasonableness. Protection extends to one's reasonable
expectation of privacy.' °6 The reasonableness of that expectation
depends, in turn, on the extent to which the expectation is one that
"society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."'" Although, as noted,
the public holds an interest in fair administration of bankruptcy cases,
the public also maintains an interest in protecting the privacy of its
personal and financial information, thereby preventing identity fraud and
protecting the integrity of the financial system. Judicial and political
responses to privacy issues in bankruptcy before and after Barman
demonstrate that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable an
expectation of privacy for individual debtors in bankruptcy beyond the
home for these reasons. The following Parts make clear that society is
not prepared to make relinquishing privacy a condition of the
bankruptcy bargain.
IV. THE PREVIOUS BALANCE
The Truck-A-Way court's conclusion that invasion of an individual
debtor's privacy degrades and impugns the integrity of the court and'
interferes with the administration of justice is not an anomaly.
Bankruptcy courts have consistently indicated that relinquishing all
expectation of privacy is not a condition of the bankruptcy bargain. In
particular, the willingness of courts to recognize a reasonable expectation
of privacy in bankruptcy has two manifestations. First, protection of an
individual debtor's privacy has extended to personal interests beyond the
home. Second, the courts addressing privacy in the bankruptcy context
frequently distinguish the reasonable expectation of privacy of a business
or corporate debtor from that of an individual debtor. The natural
conclusion to draw from these holdings is that an individual debtor
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy after filing a bankruptcy
petition that is vested in all individual persons, but which extends beyond
merely one's privacy interests in one's home to reach other personal
interests. Part V will show that this protection also extends to financial
interests.
104. Kuretich, supra note 70, at 59.
105. Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403,413 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
io6. Id. at 413-14 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
107. Id.
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Seventeen years before the Barman decision, the District Court for
the Northern District of California, in In re Benny addressed the
individual debtor's objection to the trustee's redirection of mail from the
debtor's business and residential addresses to the trustee's office.'o° The
court considered the extent of the trustee's power to redirect mail.
Although a debtor will typically be required to turn over business-related
mail to the trustee under ii U.S.C. § 542(a), "[t]he trustee is a creature
of statute and has only those powers conferred thereby."'" The court
refused to infer a power circumventing the requirements of iI U.S.C.
§ 542(e), when such power "is nowhere explicitly authorized by law" and
"when such an inference runs counter to fundamental principles long
cherished by the citizenry .... An individual debtor "must cooperate with
the statutory scheme, to be sure. But he does not thereby automatically
suffer a loss of important civil rights .... The court acknowledged that
redirecting mail had become commonplace; however, habit was
insufficient to legitimize an unlawful exercise of power that "threaten[ed]
significant privacy interests .... Contrary to the determination of the
Barman court, seventeen years prior to Barman, the Benny court firmly
acknowledged, "such overbroad invasion of privacy [could not] be
justified by the need to obtain assets and business information which are
transmitted through the mail."'"3
In accord with Benny are In re Coats and In re Crabtree, fifteen and
sixteen years before Barman, respectively."4 The Bankruptcy Court for
io8. In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Among the intercepted mail were letters from
the debtor's attorneys, bills, and personal letters addressed to the debtor, his wife, and children. Id. at
757-58.
io9. Id. at 760 (citing ii U.S.C. §§ 701 (trustee appointed by court), 702 (or elected by creditors),
and 704 (listing trustee's duties)) (2000). Section 542(a) reads, in part, "an entity, other than a
custodian in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell,
or lease ... shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property."
I I U.S.C. § 542(a) (2000).
i o. In re Benny, 29 B.R. at 761 (emphasis added). Section 542(e) reads, "Subject to any applicable
privilege, after notice and a hearing, the court may order an attorney, accountant, or other person that
holds recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the debtor's
property or financial affairs, to turn over or disclose such recorded information to the trustee." I I
U.S.C. § 542(e) (2000).
iii. In re Benny, 29 B.R. at 766 (emphasis added). Consequently, "a trustee's right to receive the
mail does not necessarily include the right to redirect the bankrupt's mail-both business and personal.
or either-without notice to the bankrupt and opportunity to object." Id. at 761. Accordingly, the
court ordered the trustee to refrain from redirecting the debtor's non-business mail without notice and
an opportunity to object. Id. at 770. In the absence of an objection, the trustee should promptly
forward said mail to the debtor and refrain from opening obviously non-business mail. If the debtor
objected, a neutral administrator would separate the mail. Id.
112. Id. at 764.
113. Id. at 764-65. The court reaffirmed that "the demands of efficiency and enforcement of the
bankruptcy laws do not necessarily outweigh interests in privacy and free expression." Id. at 766.
Holding efficiency above privacy "encroaches upon fundamental rights and liberties." Id. at 769.
iI4. In re Coats, 53 B.R. 64, 66 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); Norwood v. Crabtree (In re Crabtree), 37
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the Northern District of Texas, in Coats, recognized the potential tension
between a trustee's duty to maximize the estate and the duty, as an
officer of the court, to protect a debtor's constitutional rights."' Relying
on Benny, the court determined that the trustee's redirection of mail was
improper."16 Similarly, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, in Crabtree, determined that such a "substantial
encroachment upon Idefendant's] constitutional right to privacy" was
"unreasonable and not warranted."" 7
A second area in which courts have addressed the constitutional
rights of debtors involves the attorney-client privilege. In In re O.P.M.
Leasing Services, for example, the trustee asked the corporate debtor's
former counsel to turn over all documents relating to the debtor, but the
counsel and the debtor's former officers and directors objected, asserting
attorney-client privilege. " 8 In addressing the issue of who had the right to
waive or assert that privilege, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege
passed to the trustee along with powers to manage and investigate the
debtor's affairs."9 However, the individual attorney-client privilege of the
officers remained "fully protected .... .
In Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,"' the
Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in which the trustee claimed
the power to waive the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege in
B.R. 430, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
115. In re Coats, 53 B.R. at 65-66.
16. Id. at 66. However, because probable cause existed that the debtor had not turned over all
property of the estate, the Coats court, similar to the Benny court, authorized a neutral administrator
to receive the debtor's mail but to immediately forward, unopened, mail from the debtor's attorney or
mail of a personal nature. Id.
117. In re Crabtree, 37 BR. at 432. The court had no reason to believe that the defendant, the
debtor's secretary, possessed information relating to property of the estate. Ultimately, the court
merely required the defendant to turn over, to a neutral party, mail relating to the debtor or the
bankruptcy estate. Id.
i 8. In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 B.R. 64,66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
8I9. Id. at 67. In support of its holding, the court cited and relied on several cases decided under
the old Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 68 (citing Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (8923); Weck v. Dist. Ct., 422
P.2d 46 (Colo. 8967); In re Cont'l Mortgage Investors, No. 76-59 (D. Mass. July 38, 8979)). On the
other hand, the court summarily dismissed two cases in which the trustee was not given the authority
to waive or assert the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege. Id. at 69 (citing In re Hyman Elec.
Corp., No. Bk-7 8-o-26 (D. Neb. Sept. 27, 1978) (holding that the trustee does not succeed to privilege
because privilege not property and not part of estate); Ross v. Popper, 9 B.R. 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. i98o)
(stating that only authorized officer or director can waive privilege because trustee primarily
represents interests of general creditors)). Compare In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 83 B.R. at 68-69
with Hudtwalker v. Van Nostrand & Martin (In re Vantage Petrol. Corp.), 40 B.R. 34, 39 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 8984) ("Trustees are not entitled to waive the corporate debtors' privilege, provided that the
parties attempting to assert the privilege prove that these corporations have officers and/or directors
currently in office.").
820. In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., 83 B.R. at 68.
121. 478 U.S. 343, 345-46 (1985) -
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order to respond to inquiries from the Commission regarding the
debtor's alleged violation of the Commodity Exchange Act. The
corporation's remaining officer and director argued that he retained the
power to assert or waive the privilege.2 The Court explained that the
privilege rested with the actor whose duties in bankruptcy most closely
resembled management of the corporation outside of bankruptcy.'23
Given the responsibilities of the trustee under the Bankruptcy Code, in
the opinion of the Court, the trustee's duties more closely resembled
those of the solvent corporation's management.'24 Consequently, the
privilege vested in the trustee. 5 However, the Court made clear that this
holding "has no bearing on the problem of individual bankruptcy .... ,,...
The Court's reasoning underlying its holding did not apply to an
individual debtor because "an individual [debtor], in contrast, can act for
himself; there is no 'management' that controls a solvent individual's
attorney client privilege.' 2.
Notably, the Arizona Court of Appeals limited Weintraub even
further in JNC Companies v. Meecham2s Reflecting on the
constitutional rights of debtors, the court ruled that the bankruptcy
trustee could not waive the corporate debtor's right to a jury trial in a
criminal proceeding or interfere with the debtor's right to choose its
counsel.'29 The court "found no indication that Weintraub... authorizes
the trustee to exercise his/her power over the estate at the expense of the
debtor's constitutional rights. ''30
That theme, court protection of individual debtors' constitutional
rights, even at the expense of a step toward an arguably more efficient
bankruptcy system, permeates bankruptcy jurisprudence, from searching
homes, as noted in Part I, to redirecting mail.' 3' Moreover, the courts'
122. Id. at 347.
123. Id. at 351-52.
124. Id. at 353.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 356.
t27. Id. Also consider the line of cases permitting the bankruptcy trustee to release business
documents of business debtors already in the trustee's possession. See, e.g., Kroll v. United States, 433
F.2d 1282, 1288 (5th Cir i97o); United States v. Masterson, 383 F.2d 6io, 613 (2d Cir. 1967); Bisno v.
United States, 299 F.2d 711, 722 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Hoyt, 53 F.2d 881, 884 (S.D.N.Y.
1931). None of these cases addressed individual debtors' rights to privacy. The Fourth Amendment
rights of the individuals objecting were not implicated because they did not qualify as "aggrieved
persons" with standing to challenge the trustee's actions. However, in the hypothetical case of a
trustee's search of an individual debtor's property, that individual should presumably be able to show
"that the search was directed against him." Masterson, 383 F.2d at 613.
128. 797 P.2d i (Ariz. Ct. App. i99o).
129. Id. at4.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3 d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a debtor's allegations
regarding warrantless entry of home and seizure of personal property sufficient to state a Fourth
Amendment claim); Wade v. Smith, No. IP 88-65-C, 199i WL 504873, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 1991)
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greater willingness to subordinate the privacy rights of corporate debtors
provides an illustrative contrast to the greater safeguard of individual
debtors' liberties. As the Supreme Court explained, while the power of a
trustee over constitutional rights of corporate debtors may be justified
under the Code given the trustee's management role in such cases, no
similar justification exists in the case of an individual debtor.'32 An
individual person is vested with fundamental constitutional rights,
outside of the bankruptcy context. These rights are not discharged along
with debt when a bankruptcy petition is filed. Accordingly, surrendering
the right to privacy is not a condition clearly incident to filing an
individual bankruptcy petition as may be the case for a corporate debtor.
V. POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THREATS TO INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS' PRIVACY
Political response to threats to individual debtors' privacy, including
Barman and in particular The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, provides
the final evidence of society's willingness to accept as reasonable a
debtor's expectation of privacy in bankruptcy, and effectively amounts to
an effort to restore the balance that the Act and Barman disturbed. In
particular, the debate surrounding on-line availability of individual
debtors' personal and financial information has elicited extreme concern
regarding the threat presented to debtors' privacy.'33 Specifically, the
potential for identity theft has far-reaching consequences. The threat to
the individual debtor is most obvious; an already tenuous financial
condition can be made worse."M The bankruptcy system would be
rendered ineffective and resort to its safe harbor will be chilled. The
financial industry may falter as the bankruptcy system fails to provide
sufficient structure for resolving outstanding debt, individual debtors
become less able to maintain healthy credit, and the industry becomes a
more accessible target for fraud. Finally, even those not personally filing
a bankruptcy petition are at risk of having sensitive information
(allowing Fourth Amendment claim regarding trustee's search to go forward and stating, "[a]
bankrupt does not relinquish all Fourth Amendment protections upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.").
132. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,345-46 (1985).
133. Apart from the unique threats facing debtors' privacy in an on-line world, identity theft has
been targeted as a concern facing all consumers. As a result, consumer privacy legislation has taken
center stage. See, e.g., Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act, H.R. 237, io7th Cong. (2001);
Consumer Online Privacy and Disclosure Act, H.R. 347, Io7th .Cong. (2OO); Online Privacy
Protection Act of 2oor, H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001); The Privacy Commission Act, H.R. 4049, 107th
Cong. (2ooi); Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, S. 420, Io7th Cong. (2oot) (regarding sale of consumer
data collected by now insolvent dot-coms); Financial Information Privacy Protection Act of 2ooi, S.
30, I07th Cong. (2001); Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act of 2001, S. 197, I07th Cong.;
Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2004). See also Stefania R. Geraci, Privacy
Legislation: Has the Time Come?, E-CosM. L. & STRATEGY, Mar. 200, at 7; Lauter, supra note 48, at 1o.
134. See infra note 142.
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exposed.' Even after filing a petition in bankruptcy, the conclusion of
public discourse is that debtors are not expected to relinquish all rights to
privacy.
In contrast to those concerns advanced in support of The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of I999, the proponents of greater privacy
protection advance seven general arguments. First, unlimited access
intrudes upon privacy rights., 6 Second, invasion of privacy chills those
seeking the protection afforded by the Bankruptcy Code.'37 Third, public
dissemination of bankruptcy matters places a stigma on debtors and
damages their chances of obtaining a "fresh start."'' s Fourth, access to
bankruptcy information creates an inconsistent treatment of parties to
different types of litigation.'39 Fifth, unlimited access leads to identity
theft, credit fraud, and general economic harms to debtors.'40 Sixth,
access may lead to threats of physical harm. 4' Finally, unlimited access to
debtors' information may lead to predatory lending practices.' 2
These arguments detail valid public interests that went unaddressed
by the Barman court and suffered after the passage of The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1999. Consequently, in the spring of 2000, President
Clinton, in a speech on privacy at Eastern Michigan University,
acknowledged this growing concern and noted the tension between
increased financial privacy protection in certain areas and the lack of
privacy for an individual debtor.4 3 On April 30, 2000, Clinton introduced
"The Clinton-Gore Plan to Enhance Consumers' Financial Privacy:
Protecting Core Values in the Information Age."'" Part of the plan
135. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
136. See Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at io7o ("unlimited access impinges unnecessarily on
privacy rights, by providing more access than is necessary to achieve the public benefits of evaluating
and monitoring a government process"); see also supra Parts III and IV.
137. See Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at io7o. Relevant to this argument is the idea, as discussed
in Part III, that increased decreased privacy could lead to an increase in prosecutions for bankruptcy
fraud. See supra notes 86 and 93 and accompanying text.
138. See BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 4, 22; Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at I07o.
139. See Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at 1O7O; supra note 71 and accompanying text.
140. See BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 4, 20; Komuves, supra note 59, at 569-71 (discussing
the threats related to using Social Security Numbers as identifiers generally); Obee & Plouffe, supra
note 52, at io7o; see also Alexander & Slone, supra note 51, at 438 (illustrating the potential danger of
extortion); Guzinski I, supra note 51, at 16 (discussing the danger surrounding the sale of information
by those with access to third parties).
141. See Obee & Plouffe, supra note 52, at io7o.
142. See BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 22. This presents a special problem for debtors
because one cannot receive another discharge under chapter 7 for another seven years or another
three years under chapter 13 if the debtor ends up in financial difficulty as a result of lenders targeting
vulnerable debtors. See id.
143. See Wallace, supra note 67. For examples of the increased financial privacy protection
referred to, see supra note 133.
144 . THE CLINTON-GORE PLAN TO ENHANCE CONSUMERS' FINANCIAL PRIVACY: PROTECTING CORE
VALUES IN THE INFORMATION AGE, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WHI/New/html/
2000050x4.html; Guzinski I, supra note 51, at I6.
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called for a joint study conducted by the Department of Justice,
Department of Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget,
entitled "Financial Privacy in Bankruptcy: A Case Study on Privacy in
Public and Judicial Records."'45 The findings of the study indicated that
"[a]lthough information provided by debtors in consumer bankruptcy
is essential to the administration of cases and to the integrity of the
bankruptcy system, the comprehensive data provided by debtors
contain sensitive personal information .... This information, if used
improperly, can damage a debtor's ability to obtain the financial 'fresh
start' afforded by bankruptcy, and can be used to perpetrate identity
theft and other crimes.' ' 46
Moreover, the study acknowledged that new technologies heightened the
threat to debtors' privacy interests. 47 The study recommended that
access by the general public-other than parties in interest-to personal
bankruptcy information should be more restricted.' 8
The Judicial Conference of the United States also expressed concern
regarding bankruptcy courts' management of the privacy issue.'49 In June
1999, the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and
Case Management formed the Subcommittee on Privacy and Public
Access to Electronic Case Files.'50  The Subcommittee solicited
commentary on privacy and public access."' Ultimately, the
Subcommittee, in its "Report on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic
Case Files," determined that "[c]ertain types of cases, categories of
information, and specific documents may require special protection from
unlimited public access.""'5 In order to accommodate access and interests
in privacy, the Subcommittee recommended that bankruptcy documents
"be made generally available electronically to the same extent that they
are available at the courthouse" with two changes in access policy.'53
First, the Bankruptcy Code and Rules should be amended to allow the
court to collect the debtor's Social Security Number but only display the
145. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55.
146. Id. at 4.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 6 ("Bankruptcy information policy should better balance society's interests in fair and
efficient case administration, bankruptcy system integrity, government accountability, and the debtor's
privacy.").
149. Susan M. Thurston, New Privacy Rules Effective Dec. 1, 2003: From Conception to
Implementation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 22, 2003, at 36.
15o. Id.
151. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMrTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE
MANAGEMENT ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES, available at
http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/Policy.htm [hereinafter PRIVACY REPORT]. The committee established
a website at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov and held a workshop on Issues of Privacy and Access to
Bankruptcy Data to solicit comments.
152. Id. at 2.
153. Id. at 6.
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last four digits.'54 Second, ii U.S.C. § Io7(b)(2) should be amended to
provide for security and privacy concerns as a basis for sealing
documents.'55
In response to these recommendations, the Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules proposed amendments to Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure 1005, i007, and 2002. After these changes,
debtors would continue to submit their full Social Security Numbers with
the court but not file the full number. Consequently, only parties in
interest, i.e. creditors, would have access to the full Social Security
Numbers. The Supreme Court adopted the proposed amendments and
the changes became effective on December 1, 2003."6
The theme permeating the public debate has been balance. Rather
than endorsing either unlimited access or complete privacy, the issue has
become how to balance concerns regarding access to court information
with protection of individual debtors' interest in personal and financial
privacy."' The studies noted above have all focused on satisfying
society's conflicting interests in both access and privacy. As technology
has developed, society's interest in protecting financial and personal
property has justifiably grown. Consequently, to account for the growing
number of threats to personal and financial information, the level of
privacy protection that society has come to accept as reasonable has
increased greatly. Recent political response has acknowledged that those
threats are particularly acute for individual debtors who are already in
financially vulnerable positions by increasing the safeguards for the
privacy interests of individual debtors, thereby evidencing society's
willingness to accept as reasonable a debtor's expectation of privacy in
bankruptcy.
154. Id. In the informed recommendation of the Subcommittee, a "debtor's personal, identifying
information and financial account numbers will not be included in their complete forms on any
document, whether electronic or hard copy." Id.
155. Id. Section io7(b)(2) presently reads, in part, "the bankruptcy court may.. . protect a person
with respect to scandalous or defamatory matter contained in a paper filed in a case under this title."
I I U.S.C. § Io7(b)(2) (2000).
156. Thurston, supra note 149, at 36-37. The changes affected Rules Ioo5 , lOO7, and 2002, and
Official Forms I, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, IO, 16A, 16C, and 19. See FEDERAL RULEMAUNG: PENDING RULES
AMENDMENTS AWAITNG FINAL ACTION (Aug. 2001-Dec. 2003 Amendments), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules6.htm. Specifically, the amendment to rule ioo5 implemented
the Judicial Conference policy by requiring only the last four digits of the debtor's social security
number to be disclosed in the title of the case. Under the new Rule Ioo7, a debtor submits, but does
not file, the full Social Security Number with the bankruptcy petition, and the full Social Security
Number is not deemed part of the court record available to the public. Under new Rule 2002, the full
Social Security Number will be included in the notice to creditors required under Ii U.S.C. § 341, but
all except the last four will be displayed in the court file.
157. BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 55, at 6; Guzinski I, supra note 51, at 16 ("[J]ust how much
access is appropriate given the sensitivity of the information contained in bankruptcy files[?]").
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CONCLUSION
There was a time when incurring debt and becoming insolvent was
considered a crime. "Bankrupts" were subject to traditionally criminal
punishments such as imprisonment and death. 58 Filing a bankruptcy
petition, however, is no longer a crime. Individual debtors should not be
stripped of their constitutional rights for merely seeking the protection of
the Bankruptcy Code. Contrary to the findings of the Barman court,
surrendering privacy is not a condition of the bankruptcy bargain.
Although individual debtors can expect justifiable scrutiny of their
financial interests by a limited number of individuals, more than that is
unnecessary and poses a threat to legitimate personal, private interests.
Society's historical willingness to accept limited intrusion into individual
debtors' personal affairs and, moreover, to recently expand the protected
sphere of interests indicates that an individual debtor's expectation of
privacy is a reasonable one. That willingness establishes a subtle balance
that both protects individual debtors' constitutional rights to privacy and
maintains the integrity of the bankruptcy system to provide those debtors
with the "fresh start" embodied in the Code.
158. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7-12 (1995).
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